Bigthink - Idea Comments Feed

Comment on: Free Will and Human Nature

Bigthink — Mon, 31 Mar 2008 19:26:37 +0100

In my opinion there is no such thing as a FREE WILL. We have already made a choice long before we start thinking about it and start giving ourselves reasons as to why we made that particular choice. Depending on individual human nature, and the amount of knowledge and experience ( the amount of pain or pleasure which is associated with the result of every choice we make )that has been accumulated the justifications we give ourselves for making a choice are constantly revised. Irrationality remains part of that decision making process ( when too many drives are competing to come to the fore and none succeeds our intellect plays the CHANCE DICE ).

Comment on: Free Will and Human Nature

Bigthink — Fri, 01 Feb 2008 21:52:27 +0100

Everyone should read Pinker's best book, _The Blank Slate_. It is to human minds what Jared Diamond's _Guns, Germs and Steel_ is to human societies. Actually, read both these books. Our world is accelerating and a lot of people are getting left behind.

Comment on: Free Will and Human Nature

Bigthink — Fri, 25 Jan 2008 18:40:51 +0100

Pinker is essentially describing 'Determinism', a philosophy Einstein also subscribed too. Not Fatalism, many people confuse the two.

Comment on: Free Will and Human Nature

Bigthink — Tue, 22 Jan 2008 04:52:16 +0100

If you don't have free will and your brain makes all your choices for you, then shouldn't each choice be easy to make. How do you account for hard choices? Also, if we don't have free will, why do we feel like we do. I can't think of any logical reason for the brain to develop so that it makes an illusion that you are making choices.

Comment on: Free Will and Human Nature

Bigthink — Mon, 21 Jan 2008 01:35:28 +0100

I think, if I've understood correctly that my free will is made up of many variables and not by some etherial entity. In that I am constantly being exposed to new things and my brain is doing what it should (:-)) then the old and new would be rearranging and adapting and the outcome - not at all easily predictable.

Comment on: Free Will and Human Nature

Bigthink — Sat, 19 Jan 2008 20:48:43 +0100

I contend that the question of whether we have free will or not is irrelevant. This is based on the assertion that even if we have no free will and all our actions are set in stone and predetermined, it is of no consequence unless we are able to know what those future actions are, and our future actions can not be fully determined. Mr. Pinker implies that our actions are not determinable, but the justification is that we are too complex. This may be the case, but only implies that we can not now determine our future actions, but does little to demonstrate that future actions are, in fact non-determinable. If a hyper-advanced alien race came here, would we be too complex for them do determine our actions? A stronger demonstration of the non-determinability of future actions can be found in Alan Turing's proof on non-determinability (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing's_proof). I will not go too much into it here, but one of the key features of his proof is that even in a deterministic system (which we would have to be if we had no free will) not all solutions are determinable if the mechanism that is doing the examining is part of the same system that is being examined. The problem is introspection.
What social science (in fact all science) assumes is that the universe is deterministic. But since Turing (and others) have demonstrated that being deterministic is not sufficient for determinability when the determiner is part of what is being determined it is invalid to assert that the future is fully predictable from within the universe, even in a fully deterministic universe. (say that three times fast) If being part of a deterministic system does not imply our actions are determinable, then there is no meaningful difference between having or not having free will.

Comment on: Free Will and Human Nature

Bigthink — Sat, 19 Jan 2008 04:49:06 +0100

Karin,
The objective of punishment for behaviors deemed criminal is to prevent them. Taking consideration of one%u2019s genetics, upbringing, or the society itself is not immoral or unjust, independent of ones view on free will. Whether one is responsible for the criminal act or not, the society is responsible for protecting its members and must act in accordance with that responsibility. If knowledge of a criminal%u2019s genetics, upbringing, or relationship to the society helps the society perform its obligations, then consideration should be given. While one may argue that punishment, as a form of retaliation or vengeance, is immoral if we have no free will and are not responsible for our actions, this type of punishment differs from that which a society should involve itself.
There are two aspects of most systems of criminal deterrence; determining guilt, and sentencing. A person%u2019s guilt should be determined independent of factors like genetics, upbringing and the like, but once an individual is deemed guilty the sentencing must be made in the best interest of the society and the individual, with the society given precedence. Sentencing usually involves some sort of punishment, and in determining what type of punishment would best serve the society and the individual, all factors that led to the commission of the crime should be considered.

Comment on: Free Will and Human Nature

Bigthink — Thu, 17 Jan 2008 00:39:14 +0100

Does this imply that it is morally objectionable to punish criminals for being victims of their genetics, upbringing, and society?