Transcript: I guess I would go back to the idea that I . . . my world is the world of perception.  So the question . . . I guess I’ll answer it this way: “How are America’s actions perceived?”  And then therefore, how are they affecting the issues?  Many of America’s actions are definitely perceived very negatively.  And in some cases, like the abuses of Abu Ghraib, and the reported abuses in Guantanamo are directly feeding into the perception that America is at war with Islam. The war in Iraq, likewise, is also being perceived very negatively by Muslims at large.  So there is a lot that America can do to counteract some of these perceptions.  In some cases, there will be no way to counteract the perceptions, and there will have to be discussions about whether or not policy needs to change on the ground. One of the most important first steps toward that peace is just simply understanding the point of view of Muslims.  Where are they coming from, and how are they perceiving America’s actions?  Right now, I feel that there is too much talking and maybe not enough listening of the point of view of Muslims.  And more of an emphasis needs to be put on understanding rather than trying to get Muslims to understand America’s perspective.  That is counterproductive.  Unless Muslims feel validated by being understood, it’ll be very difficult for them to be convinced of anything America has to say. I have no reason to believe that no matter what there will be problems in the Middle East, simply because the Middle East was a place of relative peace for hundreds of years.  So I don’t think there is anything about the region that genetically makes it prone to violence or conflict.  But I do think that certain geopolitical realities make conflict more likely in the Middle East for several reasons; but all of these things, I think, are . . . it is possible to work past them and to make the Middle East a place of stability and peace.

Recorded on: 7/3/07

Transcript: I would love to interview Nelson Mandela.  He’s someone that I admire greatly.  And the question that I would ask him would be, “How and where did he find the amazing spirit and strength to endure so patiently, and for so long, and so . . . and with so much optimism?”  What he did to at the end find success.  “How do we gain inspiration from his perseverance?”  That would be the question I would want to know the answer to.

Recorded on:  7/3/07

Transcript: I think it will be remembered as an age of asymmetric warfare and a great deal of violence.  Just the number of casualties and deaths that we’ve witnessed is huge.  And I think it will also be an age of great disparities in terms of economic differences; in terms of wealth as well as poverty.  It’s an age of paradoxes and contradictions.  On one hand, the most advanced technologically; and on the other hand, simple things that we can’t find solutions to.  So it’s really an age of contrasts and contradictions.

Recorded on: 7/3/07

Transcript: Well I think a lot of people have written extensively on what is called the “youth bulge”, where the majority of the Muslim world is below the age of adulthood.  And at the same time, this huge youth bulge is not being sustained; or its energy is not being utilized in economic growth, or in job creation.  So we have a huge youth bulge in the Muslim world, but not the jobs to support it.  And I think that that problem is one that we have to address.  But from my data, our analysis – my team’s analysis – shows that those who sympathize with terrorism are not actually more likely to be unemployed.  I don’t think that takes away from the need to address this issue.  I’m just not sure that it’s at the heart of the terrorism problem.

Recorded: 7/3/07

Transcript: I think there are many problems. If we look at what Muslims themselves are saying are their greatest problems, they really cite political and economic corruption very, very clearly. They are very critical of their own societies. It’s really a myth to think that Muslims aren’t engaging in self-criticism. That’s simply not true. And at the same time, admire the . . . what they perceive to be a great deal more justice that exists in the political system in the west. So the disconnect isn’t that democracy isn’t admired, but rather that Muslims believe that the democratic principles the west often preaches, they’re not practicing when it comes to their part of the world. The historical figure that I find most inspiring is, as a Muslim, the prophet Mohammed. Peace be upon him. And I think that the reason for that is because he brought to the world a message that could resonate with the young and the old at the same time, the rich and the poor at the same time, women and men at the same time. He brought a message that was so resilient and so flexible that it could thrive in societies as different as China and Nigeria. And I think that one of the biggest challenges today is to rediscover that vitality and not allow Islam to become ossified as a rigid force. In very basic terms, he brought a message that said that nothing was worthy of worship except God. And what that means . . . the implications of that simple message was that all humans had. . . were therefore equal. If no one could be worshipped except God, then no one was superior to anyone else. In fact, explicitly he said that all human beings are as equal as teeth on a comb. So the way I understand that, it was a message of human liberation – a liberation from slavery from one human to another, and instead for all humans to serve God alone. We actually have done some work on Muslim minorities in the west in London, Paris and Berlin. And we found some very interesting and very surprising evidence to show that Muslims are no more likely than the general public in these countries to feel alienated from the nation that they have chosen to live. In fact, believe it or not, in London, Muslims are more likely than the general public to say that they identify strongly with the U.K. as their country. So what we found in general . . . the general theme is that Muslims identify strongly with their nation, and at the same time also identify strongly with their faith. And we did not find any evidence to show that the two were tradeoffs. So for example, those who identified strongly with their faith were not more likely to identify less strongly with their nation; that the two were mutually enriching, not mutually exclusive; national and religious identities mutually enriching, not mutually exclusive. Where Muslims in these countries and the general public differ most was on issues of social morality. So what Muslims actually mirrored where we would find . . . where we would expect to find conservative American Christians. So where . . . thought that things like abortion, extramarital affairs and these types of issues were morally wrong, whereas the general European social norm was that these things, of course, were non-issues. So whereas Muslims identified strongly with their nation – and in fact were more likely than the general population to favor mixed neighborhoods . . . so they weren’t interested in isolating – they were different than the general population in social, moral outlook. So the question really becomes, “Is that difference an issue?” Or are diverse societies always going to have differences in social morality? And I think that Europe could really learn by looking to the United States, where there is a huge amount of diversity in our own outlook as Americans as to social issues; but that at the end of the day we’re still all American. And we don’t . . . we don’t make it some kind of a litmus test in terms of cultural conformity to measure the amount of “Americanness” that one holds. And that same concept, I think, needs to translate into many of these European societies so that they don’t alienate their Muslim citizens. We actually asked women in these countries, “Do you wear hijab?” And in both cases – when they said “yes” or “no” – we asked why. And what we found is that the most frequent . . . by far the most frequent response of why women do wear hajib was very simply that it was their religious conviction to do so. So nobody essentially said it was, you know, a statement to . . . in defiance of the culture of Europe, or was a political statement or, you know, a statement of defiance. An overwhelming majority just simply said it was their religious conviction. At the same time, only about 2% said that it was something that a male relative asked them to do. So, at least according to our data, this is something that people are choosing to do, and they’re doing it just for the most simple reason ever: just because they believe it is their . . . it is required by their faith. And that brings us to the second point of, “What does it mean when it’s banned?” If people do believe in their own belief system that this is a requirement of their faith, and the state is prohibiting them from carrying out an aspect of their faith, how can we in a liberal society really support such an act by the state to prevent the free practice of religion, especially in a way where it’s simply not affecting anyone else? It’s how one . . . a woman chooses to dress. So I think what needs to be understood, and really what the data clearly shows, is that hajib should not be over . . . Its meaning should not be overestimated as a political statement. It is simply an act of piety.

Recorded on: 7/3/07

Transcript:

I also think one of the biggest issues is a misdiagnosis of the problem we’re facing in the war on terror. What I read in the paper is that this war on terror . . . this whole campaign to fight terrorism is really characterized as Cold War II – a battle of ideologies. And our President says that all the time: “This is the defining battle in our century of two ideologies.” And I think framing it in those terms is very counterproductive, because what Muslims hear is it’s between the west and Islam. What are the two ideologies? Because this might seem strange, but terrorism is not seen as driven by an ideology; it is a tactic that, for a Muslim viewing it, they don’t see it as being driven by a specific and very unique ideology. It’s just these people are essentially criminals committing a criminal act. And it’s a tactic. So to then frame the issue as a clash between ideologies, there’s no ideology really left except Islam itself. And so then it becomes very obvious why a recent poll showed that eight out of 10 in some of the most populous Muslim countries in the world say that the war on terror is a war on Islam. And it comes from this characterization of the war on terror as a Cold War II. Whereas if it can instead be framed as a war against a criminal act, and where terrorists are more thought of as criminals than framed as almost evil heroes, it would help counter terrorism and our ability to have more traction in the Muslim world since Muslims and Americans actually agree in their rejection of terrorism. But yet this common ground lacks traction because of this misframing of the struggle

Recorded on: 7/3/2007 at The Aspen Ideas Festival

Transcript:  Well, I guess I’ll say . . . this might sound funny, but I don’t think co-existence is the right goal.  I think it’s too small a goal, and it’s too . . . And I think part of the problem is that our goals are sometimes too small.  Now with us . . . with people of different faiths clashing, sometimes it seems like a very ambitious goal just to co-exist.  But I believe if we can make our goal instead active cooperation between diverse groups of people where there is actually a benefit in cooperating for everyone involved, there is an incentive for . . . that people are . . . feel that they are being enriched by interacting, and learning from others who are different from them.  Only then will we actually have peace. When our goal is the absence of the negative, any small misunderstanding will turn into a crisis.  Case in point is like the cartoon controversy.  That might look like a very small incident from the outside, but it exploded into a global crisis.  And I believe it’s because there isn’t enough . . . not co-existence, but there isn’t enough active cooperation between groups.  And when we have that interdependence of actually benefitting by cooperating, not just co-existing, it becomes much more likely that we’ll (a) forgive these small things when they happen, but (2) that they won’t happen to begin with because we will have an incentive to better understand each other.  But I believe that it’s . . . you know we live . . . the cliché is “the global village”; but it’s really true.  And in the global village, there really is no other choice.  It’s either clash or active co-existence . . . or active cooperation.  And if we don’t go for that positive, active engagement with one another, I think clash is just the inevitable outcome.

Recorded on: 7/3/07

Transcript: We actually have done some work on Muslim minorities in the west in London, Paris and Berlin. And we found some very interesting and very surprising evidence to show that Muslims are no more likely than the general public in these countries to feel alienated from the nation that they have chosen to live. In fact, believe it or not, in London, Muslims are more likely than the general public to say that they identify strongly with the U.K. as their country. So what we found in general . . . the general theme is that Muslims identify strongly with their nation, and at the same time also identify strongly with their faith. And we did not find any evidence to show that the two were tradeoffs. So for example, those who identified strongly with their faith were not more likely to identify less strongly with their nation; that the two were mutually enriching, not mutually exclusive; national and religious identities mutually enriching, not mutually exclusive. Where Muslims in these countries and the general public differ most was on issues of social morality. So what Muslims actually mirrored where we would find . . . where we would expect to find conservative American Christians. So where . . . thought that things like abortion, extramarital affairs and these types of issues were morally wrong, whereas the general European social norm was that these things, of course, were non-issues. So whereas Muslims identified strongly with their nation – and in fact were more likely than the general population to favor mixed neighborhoods . . . so they weren’t interested in isolating – they were different than the general population in social, moral outlook. So the question really becomes, “Is that difference an issue?” Or are diverse societies always going to have differences in social morality? And I think that Europe could really learn by looking to the United States, where there is a huge amount of diversity in our own outlook as Americans as to social issues; but at the end of the day we’re still all American. And we don’t . . . we don’t make it some kind of a litmus test in terms of cultural conformity to measure the amount of “Americanness” that one holds. And that same concept, I think, needs to translate into many of these European societies so that they don’t alienate their Muslim citizens. We actually asked women in these countries, “Do you wear hijab?” And in both cases – when they said “yes” or “no” – we asked why. And what we found is that the most frequent . . . by far the most frequent response of why women do wear hajib was very simply that it was their religious conviction to do so. So nobody essentially said it was, you know, a statement to . . . in defiance of the culture of Europe, or was a political statement or, you know, a statement of defiance. An overwhelming majority just simply said it was their religious conviction. At the same time, only about 2% said that it was something that a male relative asked them to do. So, at least according to our data, this is something that people are choosing to do. And they’re doing it just for the most simple reason ever: because they believe it is their . . . it is required by their faith. And that brings us to the second point of, “What does it mean when it’s banned?” If people do believe in their own belief system that this is a requirement of their faith, and the state is prohibiting them from carrying out an aspect of their faith, how can we in a liberal society support such an act by the state to prevent the free practice of religion? Especially in a way where it’s simply not affecting anyone else. It’s how one . . . a woman chooses to dress. So I think what needs to be understood, and really what the data clearly shows, is that hajib should not be over . . . Its meaning should not be overestimated as a political statement. It is simply an act of piety.

Recorded on: 7/3/07

Transcript: Well I think that I wouldn’t even call it a balance, because a balance would imply a tradeoff between the two.  And I don’t think there is a tradeoff.  I think that my deeply held faith teaches me to intellectual inquiry.  It teaches integrity and honesty.  And I think that those are the core principles of good scientific inquiry.  So I have to be true to my discoveries and true to the rigor of the data, and report it exactly that way in order to be true to the values that I hold most dear.  And so I don’t think I ever feel it is a balance, but rather that one helps to assure the other; that they are co . . . that they strengthen one another; that religious principles should inspire scientists to do the best work they can.

Recorded on: 7/3/07

Transcript: The historical figure that I find most inspiring is, as a Muslim, the prophet Mohammed.  Peace be upon him.  But I think that the reason for that is because he brought to the world a message that could resonate with the young and the old at the same time, the rich and the poor at the same time, women and men at the same time.  He brought a message that was so resilient and so flexible that it could thrive in societies as different as China and Nigeria.  And I think that one of the biggest challenges today is to rediscover that vitality and not allow Islam to become ossified as a rigid force. In very basic terms, he brought a message that said that nothing was worthy of worship except God.  And what that means . . . the implications of that simple message was that all humans had. . . were therefore equal.  If no one could be worshipped except God, then no one was superior to anyone else.  In fact, exclusively he said that all human beings are as equal as teeth on a comb.  So the way I understand that, it was a message of human liberation – a liberation from slavery from one human to another, and instead for all humans to serve God alone.

Recorded on: 7/3/07

Transcript:  I think there are many problems.  If we look at what Muslims themselves are saying are their greatest problems, they really cite political and economic corruption very, very clearly.  They are very critical of their own societies.  It’s really a myth to think that Muslims aren’t engaging in self-criticism.  That’s simply not true.  And at the same time, admire the . . . what they perceive to be a great deal more justice that exists in the political system in the west.  So the disconnect isn’t that democracy isn’t admired, but rather that Muslims believe that the democratic principles the west often preaches, they’re not practicing when it comes to their part of the world. Well, I think when Islam is used to further someone’s own political or social power, then that core message of serving only God and being true to a message of selflessness is therefore forgotten.  So I think that in claiming superiority over other human beings, and in claiming a monopoly on the truth, that that core message is lost and distorted.

Recorded on: 7/3/07

Transcript: Well, I think that one of the most interesting themes in our research is that sometimes here in the west, we can become prisoners of our own clichés, as Hussein ______ said today.  Or prisoners of our own false dichotomies.  And so we sometimes look to Muslim women and we ask the question, “Do you want rights, or do you want religion?”  And that’s the dichotomy.  What we find when we ask Muslim women themselves what they in fact want, the answer is “both”.  And they see no contradiction between the faith they cherish and the rights they deserve.  And I think that’s . . . one of the most important findings is that we have to break out of these constructive, false dichotomies and really get a much more nuanced understanding of this population, which tells us that they admire much about the west.  They see no contradiction between Islam and democracy, or Islam and women’s rights.  But that these types of things have to be . . . have to grow out of their own cultural context.  They cannot be imposed from the outside. I think that there are definitely some ways that the interpretation of Islam needs to change . . . and many would argue to become more true to its spirit; that what Islam is essentially is really the collective understanding of its people, of its followers.  And so that piece of human agency is very important.  And what we . . . what we find is that not only are the majority of Muslims interpreting their faith to be to offer a vision of gender justice, but that they . . . they are, in many ways, fighting for gender justice through the framework of their faith rather than outside of it.

Recorded on: 7/3/07

Transcript: The characteristics that define people who sympathize with extremism are very counterintuitive.  So for example, they are no more likely than the population at large to be religious.  So religiosity does not correlate with sympathy for extremism, which the conventional wisdom says it’s all about religious fanaticism.  And that simply isn’t seen in the empirical data.  Another interesting finding is that the . . . those who sympathize with extremism are, on average, more educated and more affluent than the general population.  What we discovered through our analysis is that what is driving sympathy for extremism is neither poverty or piety, but instead political perceptions.

We haven’t actually talked to people who actually would or have committed acts of terrorism.  But what we have done is looked at those who were maybe likely recruits because they sympathized with the tactics of terrorism.  And this group is not driven at all by a greater sense of personal piety, or a greater importance of religion in their lives.  On the contrary, when we ask people, “Do you think 9/11 was justified?” and then ask a follow-up question, “Why do you say so?” . . . those who say that 9/11 was not justified – those who condemn 9/11 – actually justify that answer by citing religious theology.  Things like the Koran prohibits killing women and children; murder angers God.  But those who condone the attacks and say that they are justified don’t cite religion at all.  They actually cite political grievances.  They call America an imperialist power.  They discuss things like its support of the state of Israel, but don’t ever go and cite a verse from the Koran to justify their statement that 9/11 was justified.  So what we’ve found is that first, those who sympathize are no more religious than the rest of the group.  But even more than that, the justifications they actually give for their position are also not religious justifications. Well, I think when Islam is used to further someone’s own political or social power, then that core message of serving only God and being true to a message of selflessness is therefore forgotten.  So I think that in claiming superiority over other human beings, and in claiming a monopoly on the truth, that that core message is lost and distorted. Well I think religion – especially today – is often blamed for what human beings decide to do that usually has very little to do with religion.  So if I look at several studies . . . and I just go back to the empirical evidence, and even outside of Gallup to a recent study done at the University of Michigan.  It showed that sympathy for extremism – the same thing that I’m studying – there is absolutely no predictive value of religiosity.  There is no predictive value even of religious orientation, meaning are you conservative or liberal.  So I think we put too much blame on religion and fall into the scientific mistake of mistaking correlation for cause.  Yes, there is a correlation between people who commit violent acts and the fact that they claim to be religious.  But correlation and cause are two different things.  It might be more likely that this is the dominant social currency of the Muslim world . . . is Islam, just as Arab nationalism was 30 years ago.  And 30 years ago when the PLO would carry out a terrorist act, they did it in the name of secular nationalism.  Today that same act is now done in the name of Islam.  And it’s simply . . . The big difference is it’s a different social currency, a different social milieu that these two acts are occurring in.  And so the terrorists – being somewhat clever people, although not very smart – use the vehicle that is most convenient at the time.  And it will always be what resonates with people around them.  I think it’s even more important, though, to point out that it essentially hasn’t worked, because the vast majority reject the tactics of terrorist groups in this part of the world.

Recorded on: 7/3/07

Transcript: Inform the public debate with empirical data and the voice of the people so that we aren’t simply relying on assumptions or misperceptions perpetuated oftentimes by the media, which tends to gravitate to the sensational.  If we can instead inject rigorously collective empirical data into the debate, we will make . . . leaders will make better decisions. 

Recorded on: 7/3/07

Transcript: “What do I stand for?”

Recorded on: 7/3/07

Question: What forces have shaped humanity most?

Transcript: I would reframe the question, and I would actually talk about the forces within each of us as human beings.  I think . . . I really believe very strongly in the idea of human agency.  I believe in free will and I believe in choices.  I don’t think that historical forces cause things to happen.  I think human beings create historical forces.  And so where we are today is a product of individual choices.  And that is . . . I guess if we agree that where we are today isn’t a very good place, I would blame that – if you can use the word “blame” – on us as a human race falling prey to selfishness, and to going more with the call of quick benefit rather than long term selfless compassion.  So if there is an answer to that very difficult question, I would place it squarely in the lap of human agency and decisions that people make that might not be true to even their own espoused values.

Question: How has religion shaped the world?

Transcript: Well I think religion – especially today – is often blamed for what human beings decide to do that usually has very little to do with religion.  So if I look at several studies . . . and I just go back to the empirical evidence, and even outside of Gallup to a recent study done at the University of Michigan.  It showed that sympathy for extremism – the same thing that I’m studying – there is absolutely no predictive value of religiosity.  There is no predictive value even of religious orientation, meaning are you conservative or liberal.  So I think we put too much blame on religion.  And fall into to the scientific mistake of mistaking correlation for cause.  Yes, there is a correlation between people who commit violent acts and the fact that they claim to be religious.  But correlation and cause are two different things.  It might be more likely that this is the dominant social currency of the Muslim world . . . is Islam, just as Arab nationalism was 30 years ago.  And 30 years ago when the PLO would carry out a terrorist act, they did it in the name of secular nationalism.  Today that same act is now done in the name of Islam.  And it’s simply . . . The big difference is it’s a different social currency, a different social milieu that these two acts are occurring in.  And so the terrorists – being somewhat clever people, although not very smart – use the vehicle that is most convenient at the time.  And it will always be what resonates with people around them.  I think it’s even more important, though, to point out that it essentially hasn’t worked, because the vast majority reject the tactics of terrorist groups in this part of the world.

Question: How can people of different faiths co-exist?

Transcript: Well, I guess I’ll say . . . this might sound funny, but I don’t think co-existence is the right goal.  I think it’s too small a goal, and it’s too . . . And I think part of the problem is that our goals are sometimes too small.  Now with us . . . with people of different faiths clashing, sometimes it seems like a very ambitious goal just to co-exist.  But I believe if we can make our goal instead active cooperation between diverse groups of people where there is actually a benefit in cooperating for everyone involved, there is an incentive for . . . that people are . . . feel that they are being enriched by interacting, and learning from others who are different from them.  Only then will we actually have peace. When our goal is the absence of the negative, any small misunderstanding will turn into a crisis.  Case in point is like the cartoon controversy.  That might look like a very small incident from the outside, but it exploded into a global crisis.  And I believe it’s because there isn’t enough . . . not co-existence, but there isn’t enough active cooperation between groups.  And when we have that interdependence of actually benefitting by cooperating, not just co-existing, it becomes much more likely that we’ll (a) forgive these small things when they happen, but (2) that they won’t happen to begin with because we will have an incentive to better understand each other.  But I believe that it’s . . . you know we live . . . the cliché is “the global village”; but it’s really true.  And in the global village, there really is no other choice.  It’s either clash or active co-existence . . . or active cooperation.  And if we don’t go for that positive, active engagement with one another, I think clash is just the inevitable outcome.

Recorded on: 7/3/07

Transcript: I think each person should . . . what each person should be doing is really, like I said, the idea of introspection; of really doing the inner work of re-examining who we are and who we want to be.  And then working toward living out those values in our everyday life.  I think that just that process can collectively make the world much better.

Recorded on: 7/3/07

Transcript: I’m always very optimistic.  As depressing as much of the data I actually analyze tends to be, I have to be optimistic because I believe that in the end, as a human race, we can make different choices and better choices.  And that clash is never inevitable.  Things can always be improved if human beings make different decisions.  And I believe they can.

Recorded on: 7/3/07

Question: Do you have a personal philosophy?

Transcript: I think I do, and it really just consists of my . . . my deeply held values.  And I think that having a core set of values is just a compass in life that can help you . . . can help navigate through moral dilemmas.  And so I think my personal philosophy just centers around concepts of fairness, of compassion, and of honesty and responsibility.

Question: Does religion and faith influence your worldview?

Transcript: I view the world as very much a human family.  As Muslims, Muslims believe in, like I said, one God and one human family.  If you believe indeed in one God, that means he created everyone.  And it means that he is just as upset and just as angry when a child in Birmingham is hurt as he is when a child in Baghdad is hurt.  And so this idea of human universal value – that all human beings are equally valuable – is something that really is dominated in my world view.  The universal nature of our human family.

Question: What is the measure of a good life?

Transcript: The measure of a good life is one’s ability to be true to their values.

Recorded on: 7/3/07

Question: Beyond a simple title, how would you describe what you do for a living?

Transcript: Well what I do for a living is to try to understand, from an empirical viewpoint, the views, opinions, perceptions and aspirations of Muslim populations around the world.  What I try to do is, through survey research, give this population a voice through their own words.  Not by projecting my ideas on to them, but by essentially through my analysis being a mouthpiece for their voice.  Because I feel that without that – in the absence of a scholarly tool that really represents the views of entire populations – that people in general are silenced by a vocal fringe. I would define myself as a scientist, and as a translator between two cultures that today are in conflict, but that I believe can live and even thrive by cooperating.

Question: What are you best known for?

Transcript: In my career today, I think I’m best known for the discovery of some very interesting, counterintuitive pearls in survey research on Muslim populations around the world. I think some of the most interesting key findings are that, for example, the panel I did today here at Aspen.  The characteristics that define people who sympathize with extremism are very counterintuitive.  So, for example, they are no more likely than the population at large to be religious.  So religiosity does not correlate with sympathy for extremism, which the conventional wisdom says it’s all about religious fanaticism.  And that simply isn’t seen in the empirical data.  Another interesting finding is that the . . . those who sympathize with extremism are, on average, more educated and more affluent than the general population.  What we discovered through our analysis is that what is driving sympathy for extremism is neither poverty or piety, but instead political perceptions.

Question: Are extremists likely to be religious fanatics?

Transcript: Well, it’s an interesting question.  I guess my answer is I’m not sure, because we haven’t actually talked to people who actually would or have committed acts of terrorism.  But what we have done is looked at those who were maybe likely recruits because they sympathized with the tactics of terrorism.  And this group is not driven at all by a greater sense of personal piety, or a greater importance of religion in their lives.  On the contrary, when we ask people, “Do you think 9/11 was justified?” and then ask a follow-up question, “Why do you say so?” . . . those who say that 9/11 was not justified – those who condemn 9/11 – actually justify that answer by citing religious theology.  Things like the Koran prohibits killing women and children; murder angers God.  But those who condone the attacks and say that they are justified don’t cite religion at all.  They actually cite political grievances.  They call America an imperialist power.  They discuss things like its support of the state of Israel, but don’t ever go and recite a verse from the Koran to justify their statement that 9/11 was justified.  So what we’ve found is that first, those who sympathize are no more religious than the rest of the group.  But even more than that, the justifications they actually give for their position are also not religious justifications.

Recorded on: 7/3/07