It’s becoming a familiar theme. An election is held somewhere in the developing world that is hotly contested. The opposition cries foul and demands a recount. Allegations fly as both camps dig in their heels and make their pleas before the international community. Protestors might take to the streets and arrests are made. Yet there is almost something of disputed election fatigue out there after watching the mock elections held in Afghanistan, Iran, and Gabon. Ukraine, whose polls are being held in January, may be the next in line.  

 

I am baffled by how disorganized opposition movements are. Throughout the world there would be many more turnovers of power but for oppositions that are disorganized and divided. Which raises the question: If opposition leaders cannot even manage the egos and divisions within their own camps, how would they ever be able to manage a whole government bureaucracy, were they ever to take power? 

On one hand, opposition groups have never had it so good. Social media and micro-blogging sites are virtually made for them, as events in Moldova and Iran have shown. The foreign press is sympathetic, to be the point of sycophantic (see Iran). Rarely are tough questions asked or answered (like, you know, what their candidate would do once in power?). Candidates like Abdullah Abdullah shell out big bucks to hire expensive PR firms with Beltway ties. The press, always sniffing for a Cinderella story line, also tends to hype their chances and every poll number that nudges upward. In Russia, the fawning coverage abroad of chess champion Gerry Kasparov last year obscured the fact that he was a dark-horse candidate who had zero shot at winning the presidency. Still, it made for good copy.

So they have the tools at their disposal and the press behind them. Then why do so many opposition movements fizzle and fail to acquire critical mass? The reasons are manifold: First, they tend to be big tent groups. Anyone with a grievance against the government identifies with the “opposition” in most countries. Yet when the only thing that unites the disparate camps of an opposition group is a visceral hatred of the regime in power, once the bogeyman is removed, as was the case in Ukraine and Georgia, these camps realize they have little in common, nor do their leaders get along that well. Egos inevitably clash. Sharp words are exchanged. Pretty soon, the movement fizzles or turns into something more menacingly than the regime it replaced (see Kyrgyzstan).